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Abstract
Deepfake detection is formulated as a hypothesis testing problem to classify an image as genuine or GAN-generated. A
robust statistics view of GANs is considered to bound the error probability for various GAN implementations in terms of their
performance. The bounds are further simplified using a Euclidean approximation for the low error regime. Lastly, relationships
between error probability and epidemic thresholds for spreading processes in networks are established.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Deepfake, a portmanteau of “deep learning” and “fake” refers to realistic audiovisual content artificially generated using
advanced generative algorithms like generative adversarial networks (GANs), with an implied use for unethical purposes.
Concerns have been raised over the dissemination of misinformation via online channels [1], and the mistrust that deepfakes
engender [2].
The gravity of the deepfake problem has been outlined in [3]. Technologies capable of generating hyperrealistic fake images
and videos are used for dating scams, “astroturfing,” “catfishing,” and to gain the victim’s trust for blackmail, harassment, or
sabotage [4]. With an active community of developers creating free and easy tools to commoditize such technology, there is
eroded trust in visual content [5]. Such “democratization of fraud,” can have particularly grave consequences for politics and
international affairs where it could be used to incite violence, discredit leaders and institutions, or even tip elections [6] and
exacerbate disinformation wars that disrupt domestic politics [7], [8], [9].
Such alarming consequences of deepfakes present an urgent need to computationally discern fake content from genuine
as they are almost indistinguishable to humans. While several studies use features extracted based on visual artifacts, image
quality, lipsync, blinking, or warping for classification (and might soon be obsolete) [10], [11], [12], [13], this work gives a
generalizable statistical framework with guarantees on its reliability. In particular, we build on the information-theoretic study
of authentication [14] to cast deepfake detection as a hypothesis testing problem specifically for outputs of GANs, themselves
viewed through a generalized robust statistics framework [15], [16].
II. PROBLEM FORMULATION
A. GAN Formulation
The GAN trains on infinite sample images with distribution PX , to select an optimal generator function gˆ from a family
of functions G, which takes an input of Gaussian noise Z ∼ N (0, Ir) to generate an output distribution Pgˆ(Z) closest to the
input distribution as follows:
gˆ = argmin
g∈G
L(PX ,Pg(Z)). (1)
Here L : M(Rd) ×M(Rd) → R≥0 measures the distance between the two distributions. We assume that the minimum is
attained. The alternate case can be dealt with by a standard limiting argument.
1) Perturbation View of GAN : Intuitively, the generator family G of the GAN should be designed such that infg∈G L(PX ,Pg(Z))
is small. We view GANs as a generalization of the robust statistics framework [16] with the true distribution PX as a slightly
perturbed version of a generated distribution Pg(Z) under the distance measure L(·, ·). Define:
OPT := inf
g∈G
L(PX ,Pg(Z)) (2)
as the oracle error, which is the minimum distance between the generated and input distributions, for a particular GAN and
input distribution. The oracle error is fixed for a choice of L and G. Approximately solving the minimization problem by
training on finite samples from X , we still get a generated distribution within O(OPT ) distance of the true input distribution
[16]. For error analysis, we choose the following L functions — Kullback-Leibler (KL) divergence, total variational distance,
Jensen-Shannon divergence [17], and Wasserstein metric [18].
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2B. Hypothesis Test
The distribution of legitimate images is PX . The distribution generated by the GAN is Pg(Z). The n i.i.d. pixels of the input
image are Y1, Y2, Y3, . . . , Yn. Accordingly, the test is
H0 := Y ∼ PX —Legitimate
H1 := Y ∼ Pgˆ(Z) —GAN generated
where gˆ is close to the optimal result defined in (1). The assumption of i.i.d. pixels is to make the hypothesis test easier than
the non i.i.d. case seen in realistic images.
III. ERROR BOUNDS
A. General Hypothesis Testing Bounds
We have the following error bounds [19, ch. 11] for hypothesis testing:
Neyman-Pearson error: βǫn=˙ exp(−nD(PX ||Pgˆ(Z))) (3)
Bayesian error: P (n)e ≤ exp{−nC(PX ,Pgˆ(Z))}. (4)
where C is the Chernoff information, which can further be bounded in terms of total variational distance [20].
C(PX ,Pgˆ(Z)) ≥ −
1
2
log(1− TV (PX ,Pgˆ(Z))
2) (5)
We assume n is sufficiently large for asymptotic bounds to be valid, which mostly holds as the images we generally deal with
are fairly high resolution (approximately 106).
B. Deriving Bounds for Specific L-functions
We derive bounds for the Neyman-Pearson and Bayesian error probabilities for the chosen L-function implementations of
the GAN.
1) KL Divergence: We have
L(PX ,Pg(Z)) = D(PX ||Pg(Z)) ≥ OPT ∀g ∈ G.
Neyman-Pearson:
βǫn=˙ exp(−nD(PX ||Pgˆ(Z))) ≤ exp(−nOPT ). (6)
Bayesian: From the bound on Chernoff information in (5)
P (n)e ≤ exp{
n
2
log(1− TV (PX ,Pgˆ(Z))
2)} (7)
and from reverse Pinsker’s inequality (A.54), assuming P ∗g = minx Pgˆ(Z)(x) > 0,
P (n)e ≤ exp{
n
2
log(1−
P ∗g
4
D(PX ||Pgˆ(Z)))} (8)
≤ exp{
n
2
log(1−
P ∗g
4
OPT )} (9)
=
(
1−
P ∗g
4
OPT
)n/2
. (10)
2) Total Variational Distance: We have
L(PX ,Pg(Z)) = TV (PX ,Pg(Z)) ≥ OPT ∀g ∈ G.
Neyman-Pearson: Using Pinsker’s inequality (A.53)
βǫn ≤ exp(−2nTV (PX ||Pgˆ(Z))
2) (11)
≤ exp(−2nOPT 2). (12)
Bayesian: From the bound on Chernoff information in (5)
P (n)e ≤ exp{
n
2
log(1 − TV (PX ,Pgˆ(Z))
2)} (13)
≤ exp{
n
2
log(1 −OPT 2) (14)
= (1−OPT 2)n/2. (15)
3TABLE I
SUMMARY OF THE ERROR BOUNDS
L-function Neyman-Pearson
Bound
βǫn ≤
Bayesian Bound
P
(n)
e ≤
KL divergence exp(−nOPT ) (1−
P∗g
4
OPT )n/2
TV distance exp(−2nOPT 2) (1− OPT 2)n/2
JS divergence exp(−n
2
OPT 2) (1− 1
4
OPT 2)n/2
Wasserstein exp
(
− 2n
diam(X)2
OPT 2
) (
1−
(
OPT
diam(X)
)2)n/2
3) Jensen-Shannon Divergence: From the bound on Jensen-Shannon divergence (A.55):
2TV (PX ,Pg(Z)) ≥ JS(PX ,Pg(Z)). (16)
Thus, we have ∀g ∈ G
2TV (PX ,Pg(Z)) ≥ JS(PX ,Pg(Z)) ≥ OPT. (17)
Neyman-Pearson: From Pinsker’s inequality and (17)
βǫn ≤ exp(−2nTV (PX ||Pgˆ(Z))
2) (18)
≤ exp(−
n
2
OPT 2) (19)
Bayesian: From the bound on Chernoff information in (5)
P (n)e ≤ exp{
n
2
log(1 − TV (PX ,Pgˆ(Z))
2)} (20)
≤ exp
{
n
2
log
(
1−
OPT 2
4
)}
(21)
=
(
1−
OPT 2
4
)n/2
. (22)
4) Wasserstein Metric: From the bound on Wasserstein metric (A.56)
diam(X )TV (PX ,Pg(Z)) ≥W (PX ,Pg(Z)) ≥ OPT. (23)
where diam(X ) is the diameter of the space.
Neyman-Pearson: From Pinsker’s inequality and (23)
βǫn ≤ exp(−2n TV (PX ||Pgˆ(Z))
2) (24)
≤ exp
(
−
2n
diam(X )2
OPT 2
)
(25)
Bayesian: From the bound on Chernoff information in (5)
P (n)e ≤ exp{
n
2
log(1− TV (PX ,Pgˆ(Z))
2)} (26)
≤ exp
{
n
2
log
(
1−
(
OPT
diam(X )
)2)}
(27)
=
(
1−
(
OPT
diam(X )
)2)n/2
. (28)
C. Discussion
The bounds are summarized in Table I. As OPT increases, i.e., the GAN used is less accurate, it is exponentially easier
to detect deepfakes in the Neyman-Pearson case, and polynomially so in the Bayesian case. The bound decays exponentially
with the resolution n. Thus, if we require very high resolution in order to trust images, an extremely accurate GAN would be
required to go undetected.
4D. Generalizing the Problem
Images typically have regions depicting features like eyes, mouth, and hair or objects like vehicles and trees that follow a
common distribution. Consider the image to consist of k patches with m pixels each, following the distribution P
(i)
X , such that
m is still large for the hypothesis testing bounds to be valid. We now similarly define individual oracle errors for each patch
as OPTi := infg∈G L(P
(i)
X ,Pg(Z)), considering that the GAN generates each patch independently. The generalized bounds can
be obtained mutatis mutandis by multiplying together the corresponding bounds for each of the k patches obtained by using m
for n, OPTi for OPT , P
∗
gi for P
∗
g , and diam(Xi) for diam(X ) to represent the values defined for each patch of the image.
IV. EUCLIDEAN INFORMATION THEORY
With advances in deep learning and cheap availability of data, GANs have grown ever more complex and can generate a
very close version of the true distribution. This development suggests further analysis in the low error regime using the concept
of Euclidean information theory, which gives the following approximation for KL divergence [21].
Lemma IV.1 (Euclidean approximation). When two distributions are close to each other, i.e. P ≈ Q , the KL divergence
between them can be approximated as
D(P ||Q) ≈
1
2
∣∣∣∣Q− P ∣∣∣∣2
Pˆ
=
1
2
||[Pˆ−1/2](Q− P )||2 (29)
where the weight Pˆ is any distribution in the neighborhood of P and Q.
A. Simplified Bounds Using Euclidean Approximation
On applying the approximation in the hypothesis testing error bounds, we get the following:
βǫn=˙ exp(−nD(PX ||Pgˆ(Z))) ≈ exp(−
n
2
∣∣∣∣PX − Pgˆ(Z)∣∣∣∣2P ) (30)
where the weight (subscript P ) is any distribution in the neighborhood of the two distributions. Also, from [19, ch. 11]
P (n)e ≤ exp(−nD
∗(PX ||Pgˆ(Z))), where (31)
D∗(PX ||Pgˆ(Z)) = max
λ
min(D(PX ||Pλ), D(P ˆg(Z)||Pλ)) (32)
Pλ =
P
λ
XP
1−λ
gˆ(Z)∑
a∈X P
λ
X(a)P
1−λ
gˆ(Z)(a)
. (33)
Assuming PX ≈ Pgˆ(Z),Pλ is also close to the two distributions. So using the approximation in Lemma IV.1, the maximizing
λ is such that the two quantities are equal.
D∗(PX ||Pgˆ(Z)) ≈
1
2
∣∣∣∣PX + Pgˆ(Z)
2
− PX
∣∣∣∣2
PX
(34)
=
1
8
∣∣∣∣PX − Pgˆ(Z)∣∣∣∣2PX (35)
≈
1
4
D(PX ||Pgˆ(Z)). (36)
1) KL Divergence: Neyman-Pearson: The bound stays the same.
Bayesian:
P (n)e ≤ exp
(
−
n
4
D(PX ||Pgˆ(Z))
)
(37)
≤ exp
(
−
n
4
OPT
)
. (38)
2) Total Variational Distance: Neyman-Pearson: The bound stays the same.
Bayesian: Using Pinsker’s inequality
P (n)e ≤ exp
(
−
n
4
D(PX ||Pgˆ(Z))
)
(39)
≤ exp
(
−
n
4
2TV (PX ||Pgˆ(Z))
2
)
(40)
≤ exp
(
−
n
2
OPT 2
)
(41)
5TABLE II
SIMPLIFIED BOUNDS USING EUCLIDEAN APPROXIMATION
L-function Neyman-Pearson
Bound
βǫn ≤
Bayesian Bound
P
(n)
e ≤
KL divergence exp(−nOPT ) exp(−n
4
OPT )
TV distance exp(−2nOPT 2) exp(−n
2
OPT 2)
JS divergence exp(−2nOPT ) exp(−n
2
OPT )
Wasserstein exp
(
− 2n
diam(X)2
OPT 2
)
exp
(
− n
2 diam(X)2
OPT 2
)
3) Jensen-Shannon Divergence: When P1 ≈ P2 , Jensen-Shannon divergence can also be approximated in the Euclidean
regime as:
JS(P1, P2) =
1
2
[D(P1||
P1+P2
2 ) +D(P2||
P1+P2
2 )] (42)
≈
∣∣∣∣P1 − P2∣∣∣∣2P1
4
≈
D(P1||P2)
2
. (43)
Thus, we have
OPT ≤ JS(PX ,Pg(Z)) ≈
D(PX ||Pg(Z))
2
. (44)
Neyman-Pearson:
βǫn=˙ exp(−nD(PX ||Pgˆ(Z))) ≤ exp(−2n OPT ) (45)
Bayesian:
P (n)e ≤ exp
(
−
n
4
D(PX ||Pgˆ(Z))
)
≤ exp
(
−
n
2
OPT )
)
(46)
4) Wasserstein Metric: Combining the bound for Wasserstein metric in (A.56) and Pinsker’s inequality, we have
OPT ≤W (PX ,Pg(Z)) ≤ diam(X )
√
D(PX ,Pg(Z))
2
. (47)
Neyman-Pearson: The bound remains the same.
Bayesian:
P (n)e ≤ exp
(
−
n
4
D(PX ||Pgˆ(Z))
)
(48)
≤ exp
(
−
n
2 diam(X )2
OPT 2
)
(49)
B. Discussion
Table II summarizes the simplified bounds using Euclidean approximation. For the same value of OPT , we see that GANs
with Jensen-Shannon divergence as the L-function are the easiest to detect with lowest bound on the Bayesian error probability.
Also, while the relationship between the error probability and image resolution remains the same, it is exponentially easier to
detect deepfakes from GANs with higher OPT for both tests unlike the results in Table I. The exponent of Neyman-Pearson
bound is simply that of the Bayesian bound multiplied by a factor of four for all L-functions.
V. EPIDEMIC THRESHOLD THEORY AND DEEPFAKES
Deepfakes may disperse rapidly in social networks [22] with spreading dynamics similar to diseases. The SIR (susceptible-
infected-recovered) model for epidemics can be useful to assess the risk posed by a deepfake. Epidemic threshold characterizes
the critical level λc for effective spreading rate λ above which a global epidemic occurs and the spreading cannot be contained.
The threshold can be predicted based purely on the network structure [23]. The spreading rate is expressed as
λ =
β
γ
(50)
where β is the probability of transmission from an infected to susceptible node, and γ is the probability of recovery, i.e.,
probability of correctly detecting the deepfake 1− Pe. Let the bound for P
(n)
e be exp(−nf(OPT )). Thus, we have
λ ≤
β
1− exp(−nf(OPT ))
. (51)
6Along with the condition for containment λ ≤ λc, we get the following condition on OPT for the deepfake to be locally
containable.
f(OPT ) ≥ −
1
n
ln
(
1−
β
λc
)
. (52)
When f(OPT ) is greater than the expression on the right, which depends only on n and the network structure, the deepfake can
be locally confined. From Tables I and II, f is always increasing. A higher OPT , i.e., worse GAN accuracy, guarantees higher
robustness to global spread of misinformation. Thus the network will be less easily fooled by a weaker deepfake generation
system.
VI. CONCLUSION
This work provides a statistical framework to detect deepfakes and error guarantees for these tests. Avenues to extend this
study include— accounting for a possible gender, race, etc. based bias in the training data to prevent incorrect classification,
developing a similar framework for conditional GANs [24] for detecting face swapped content, and deriving error bounds
in terms of more commonly used GAN evaluation metrics as in [25]. Further, by incorporating these results with studies on
spreading dynamics of infectious diseases [26], [27], we can obtain bounds on source detection probability for deepfakes.
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7APPENDIX
IMPORTANT INEQUALITIES
A. Pinsker’s inequality:
TV (P1, P2)
2 ≤
1
2
D(P1||P2). (A.53)
Proof. The proof is given in [28].
B. Reverse Pinsker’s inequality:
For the case of finite alphabet X , when P ∗2 = minx∈X P2(x) > 0,
4
P ∗2
TV (P1, P2)
2 ≥ D(P1||P2). (A.54)
Proof. This reverse bound on total variational distance has been proved by Csisza´r and Talata [29, p. 1012].
C. Bound on Jensen-Shannon divergence:
JS(P1, P2) ≤ 2TV (P1, P2). (A.55)
Proof. The proof is given in [30].
D. Bound on Wasserstein metric:
W (P1, P2) ≤ diam(X )TV (P1, P2) (A.56)
where diam(X ) = sup{d(x, y) : (x, y) ∈ X} is the diameter of the space.
Proof. The proof is given in [31].
